Wiz disclosed yesterday that GitHub Copilot Autofix co-authored a commit in Snowflake's public repo that silently removed a safe shell-input pattern and replaced it with injectable string interpolation. Wiz's autonomous Red Agent then found the flaw, crafted a working exploit, and exfiltrated Jira API credentials — all without human input. The same loop that promises AI-driven security is also capable of closing it the other way.
PromptArmor published a working indirect prompt injection exploit against Microsoft Copilot Cowork that achieves file exfiltration from SharePoint and OneDrive with a 5-for-5 success rate — including against Claude Opus 4.7. The attack works because Cowork auto-approves Teams and email sends, and because pre-authenticated download links can be embedded in those messages as image tag query parameters. It's a reminder that "human-in-the-loop" only means something if the loop actually catches this.